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HISTORICAL REVIEW / RESEÑA HISTÓRICA
ABSTRACT In the autumn of 1964, residents and interns of Mexico's hospitals began
a strike to demand salary increases, better working conditions, and more educational
opportunities. As time passed, however, these workplace demands shifted to
encompass more global issues of social justice, the right of all Mexicans to healthcare,
and even peasant rights and agrarian reform. The Mexican government, concerned by
the growing influence of these young doctors, made it a top priority of the intelligence
service to monitor on a daily basis all Mexico City hospitals and to clandestinely
follow certain physicians. Using only a sampling of these intelligence reports, the
article reveals how the government of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz used the medical
movement to better understand the student protests of 1968.
KEY WORDS Physicians; Public Sector; Medical Staff, Hospital; Working Conditions;
Strikes, Employee; Mexico.
RESUMEN En el otoño de 1964 los residentes e internos de los hospitales de México
iniciaron un paro pidiendo aumento de salarios, mejores condiciones de trabajo y la
oportunidad de seguir estudiando. El movimiento duraría casi un año y al paso del
tiempo las demandas dejaron de ser estrictamente por cuestiones laborales y se tornaron
más universales. Los internos y residentes comenzaron a hablar sobre justicia social, el
derecho a la salud de todos los mexicanos, y aun sobre el problema agrario en la nación.
El gobierno, preocupado por la influencia que tenían estos profesionales, envió al
servicio de inteligencia a patrullar a diario todos los hospitales de la capital y a seguir
clandestinamente a ciertos médicos. Utilizando solo unos cuantos de estos reportes
diarios, se muestra cómo el gobierno de Gustavo Díaz Ordaz utilizó al movimiento
médico para entender al movimiento estudiantil de 1968.
PALABRAS CLAVE Médicos; Sector Público; Cuerpo Médico de Hospitales; Condiciones
de Trabajo; Huelga de Empleados; México.
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INTRODUCTION
The late 1960s, often associated with
social upheaval, middle-class discontent and
government repression, are again under recent
historical scrutiny (a). While one can find global
examples to fit the above descriptions it is often
Mexico, in particular Mexico City, that holds the
dubious distinction of bringing all of those
adjectives into full scrutiny when it hosted the
1968 Olympic Games. Historians of Mexico
have long argued that the massacre of students in
the Tlatelolco plaza, days before the opening
ceremonies of the XIX Olympiad, ruptured all
appearances of social stability and progress and
publicly revealed the true nature of the
authoritarian and deeply repressive governing
party. Furthermore, it has been common for
scholars to assert that the government was taken
aback by the depth of discontent and the degree
of organization of the student movement (b). But
it is only recently with the 2003 declassification
of archives from the Mexican National Security
and Investigation Center (CISEN, from the
Spanish Centro de Investigación y Seguridad
Nacional), equivalent to the FBI in the USA, that
scholars have documented proof of how trained
agents of the state instigated, orchestrated, and
fanned discontent in modern Mexico and, more
crucially, just how much information was
available to the Mexican state.
These documents are evidence that it
was in 1965 when the privileged, educated elite
of Mexico, medical residents and interns, were
firmly repressed by Gustavo Díaz Ordaz's
regime in "response" to the needs of Mexicans —
the same language that the president would use
to justify the actions against students a few years
later. It was also in 1965 when the students
joined the physicians' strike in support of their
demands and later took the doctors' form of
organizing and much of their strategy, making it
their own in 1968. In Mexico, then, it would not
be unemployed students, but young, under-
employed, highly educated state professionals
who would call into question the ruling party's
corrupt and anti-democratic government and who
initially bore the brunt of Díaz Ordaz's repressive
regime. What these documents show is that many
of the crucial protests against the Mexican state
initially took place in hospitals and not
universities as we have long believed. But the
doctors' movement, which was harshly leveled
by the administration, has mostly been forgotten
by historians. By exploring the physicians' strike
from this perspective, as the pivotal moment that
turned an administration against its young
citizens, and using newly declassified material,
we acknowledge that the physician strike of
1964-1965 became the vital training ground for
Díaz Ordaz's regime to learn how to oppress
middle class discontent.
THE MEDICAL MOVEMENT
The resident and intern's movement
began on November 26, 1964, a few days before
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz was sworn in as Mexico's
new president. As with other social movements,
the roots of this one can be traced to a specific
complaint. A few weeks earlier a rumor had
circulated that residents and interns of the 20 de
Noviembre Hospital in Mexico City would not
be receiving their customary Christmas bonus, or
aguinaldo, that year. The setting, the 20 de
Noviembre Hospital, was quite surprising for the
hospital had been open a mere handful of years
and, allegedly, served as a gleaming example of
the success of Mexico's public healthcare
system. This hospital formed part of the public
health complex — the Mexican Social Security
Institute (IMSS, from the Spanish Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social) and Institute for
Social Security and Services for State Workers
(ISSSTE, from the Spanish Instituto de Seguridad
y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del
Estado) — that had, since 1943 and 1959
respectively, provided healthcare to a large share
of Mexicans. The IMSS clinics and hospitals had
long been touted as an example of one of the
main accomplishments of Mexico's post-
revolutionary ruling party: social security.
According to its publications, Mexican social
security was "the result of one of our most
important revolutionary traditions," and
president Adolfo López Mateos himself, during
whose term in office (1958-1964) the "20 de
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Noviembre" hospital was opened, maintained
that "the social security regime constitutes one of
the essential objectives of our democratic
institutions" because within it workers could find
"one of the best means to fulfill the social justice
principles established by the Mexican
Revolution" (4). As such the opening of a new
IMSS center received much media coverage.
Furthermore, the IMSS played a vital role in the
training of Mexican physicians. In order to
graduate, all Mexican medical students were
required to spend an internship year in a
teaching hospital and the majority of these were
state-run. Consequently, all medical students
throughout Mexico competed against each other
for the few available positions in all, for
example, IMSS and ISSSTE hospitals. This placed
individual hospital administrations in a curiously
powerful position: their hiring decisions
determined which medical student applicants
would graduate every year. Taking into account
this imbalanced work situation, students with a
position in the hospital rarely complained about
their meager salaries.
However, on that day in 1964, the
rumor regarding the cancellation of a Christmas
bonus was confirmed by the head of the hospital
who explained that, despite the customary
practice, residents and interns did not deserve an
aguinaldo because they received grants rather
than salaries. In other words, since they did not
receive a salary, they were not considered
employees of the state, as they had been led to
believe, and so had no right to an aguinaldo. This
distinction, as interns and residents would later
point out, was crucial because they worked for a
state hospital; if they were not seen as state
employees then they had the right to strike
outside the established and official venues. The
government's response, the immediate firing of
two hundred interns and residents from 20 de
Noviembre Hospital, was expected. The lack of
initial support from their patients, Mexican
citizens, was not. Paradoxically most Mexicans
did not make a distinction between established,
older doctors and struggling interns and
residents: they all wore white coats. But young
residents and interns had much more in common
with students than with Mexico's "established"
medical professionals. Many residents mere
months away from having graduated from
university and were struggling to achieve the
"promise of the Mexican revolution": find suitable
housing, jobs, further education, and, in some
cases, enough money to purchase required
uniforms and textbooks (c). This tension in the
profession was also felt in the doctors' strike in
Saskatchewan, a province of Canada, in 1962 (d).
Indeed, the tension between medical practitioners
has always been a characteristic of the profession.
When describing the 19th century disputes among
medical practitioners in the USA, historian Paul
Starr emphasized the following: 
Nothing weakened the medical profession more
than the bitter feuds and divisions that plagued
doctors through the late nineteenth century. The
hatreds were sectarian: partly, they were
personal. They were open and acrimonious, and
as common the high tiers of the profession as in
the low. (6 p.93) (e)
These historical tensions would assume,
in the Mexican case, nuances of a distinctly
generational character (f).
Mimicking other struggling workers,
interns and residents scrambled to give
legitimacy to their claims by forming an official
association, the Mexican Association for Medical
Residents and Interns (AMMRI, from the Spanish
Asociación Mexicana de Médicos Residentes e
Internos), the first national organization of its
kind in Mexico. They also published their five
demands in an open letter to the incoming
president, which requested the following: 1) the
rehiring of all fired doctors; 2) an increase in the
scholarship stipend and conversion of the stipend
into a renewable contract; 3) the preferential
hiring of former residents; 4) a solution to the
problems in each hospital, and 5) increased
access to further education. Despite the fact that
these demands were centered exclusively on
benefits for young doctors, arguably the most
politically and economically powerless, less than
a week after the movement began, interns and
residents felt it necessary to take out another
page-wide spread in various newspapers to
explain that their strike was not a political act
against the incoming president (8). But what was
happening in the Mexican Republic did need an
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explanation. Within a few days nearly every
Mexican state had interns and residents walking
out of hospitals in support of their Mexico City
counterparts. For at least a month there was no
visible reaction from the new administration. The
new President, it seemed, was blindsided by the
unexpected intensity of the movement. This
description of the strike is what has been mostly
covered by secondary sources to explain the
medical movement (9-11). With new information
derived from declassified documents, the medical
movement's initial weeks become more complex.
By early December, secret service
reports reveal the initial presidential strategy: to
distance the administration from the problem
and publicly ignore the doctors. This did not
mean, however, that the administration was
uninterested or unaware of the problem. A
December 7, 1964 report revealed, for instance,
that Cisneros, secretary to the president,
chastised the doctors for trying to engage the
newly appointed President by indicating that
"your issues do not have the presidential nor
national implications that you wish to give them
since the solution is simple and within the reach
of the directors of each hospital's different
departmental area" (12 f.168). The explanation
that doctors were trying to create a national
movement when there was no reason for one
would persist in the official discourse for the
following ten months. If the government
publicly admitted that the doctors' problem was
not restricted exclusively to hospitals, but that it
instead was of national reach, the crisis affecting
the prized Mexican health system would be
revealed.
Although the amount of declassified
material on the medical movement is
astounding, its quality and purpose vary
significantly  (g).  A typical report consisted of a
daily, detailed log of every Mexico City hospital
(Figure 1). In summary format the agent
informed the reader — presumably the
administration and security forces — of the level
of organization, the names of those involved,
the hospital-specific complaints, any unusual
activity, and any actions that interns and
residents were planning to take. The latter
information is quite important for it allowed the
government to stay one step ahead of the
medical movement. For example, when the
AMMRI decided to send telegrams every 30
minutes to the president or place ads in local
newspapers, within days both radio and
newspapers were blocked to doctors. 
More chillingly, the reports reveal that
when the residents and interns decided to hire a
lawyer to help them with legal issues, CISEN
suggested hiring one of "their men" to act as
advisor and, hence, know each legal maneuver
before it became public (14).
The documents offer a rare glimpse into
the daily proceedings that escalated a grievance
into a major social movement. Agents recorded
with bureaucratic meticulousness details that
many participants involved could not or would
not want to remember. For example evidence is
gathered that showed (not surprisingly) that
"harmonious relations did not exist" among the
directors of the different hospitals. What is novel
in this assertion, however, is the clue provided
by one of the agents who observed that this lack
of harmony was due to the complete absence of
relationships between doctors from Mexico City
hospitals, including doctors from the same
hospital, who only met "sporadically" (15). In
fact, the reports show that many state-run
hospitals were like urban islands with different
hierarchies, salary scales, labor benefits, and
particular grievances. There were also distinct
prejudices among doctors from newer, "solvent"
hospitals and those laboring in poorer facilities.
The daily reports collected and registered
detailed accounts of facts, such as the total
number of hospital beds in use, and also
introduced a fiction:  speculating on physicians'
communist tendencies (h). The government
would eventually use this information to drive a
wedge between physicians from different
institutions and foster a generational gap
between established physicians and those
finishing their degrees. 
Moreover, agents' remarks reveal that
doctors encountered problems creating an
organization that could span the entire city and,
indeed, before the medical movement, organized
groups did not exist within the same hospital.  In
addition, the reports demonstrate that the doctors
tried to gain support even outside the hospitals.
As this report from December 3 illustrates:
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Figure 1. Declassified document from the Federal Security Agency (Dirección Federal de Seguridad).
Mexico DF, 8 December 1964.
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Figure 1. Continued
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Figure 1. Continued
Source: National General Archives, National Security Archives (13).
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The interns and residents are trying to gain the
support of medical students from the
Universidad Autonoma de México and for that
reason many of them are making an effort to
convince the students to lend their support; it is
known that the principle reason for not doing so
is that students are in their final exam period and
it would mean, for the moment, neglecting their
studies. (17)
The agents' reports warn that if this
organization were allowed to prosper, Mexico
City and the nation could be brought to a halt.
These notes reveal that despite its clumsiness,
the Mexican intelligence service perfectly
understood the symbolic power of striking
doctors. The doctors themselves would only
take advantage of this fact some months later,
marching in public protest dressed in their
white lab coats. Equally important are the
transcripts found among some of the reports, as
they are clear evidence that some meetings
were recorded, phones were tapped, and
homes were bugged. It is indeed unusual for
historians to have the actual words from phone
conversations or private meetings where
strategies were planned and future actions were
deliberated. A historian can use these reports to
explore how a personal grievance mutates into
a global complaint and how this, in turn,
transforms a movement. A researcher of the
past can also observe they way in which a
single idea or suggestion can acquire a very
different value when considered in a meeting
or, in the case of these doctors, taken to the
streets of Mexico City.  
It is also interesting to note how clearly
leaders began to emerge from the initial mass of
doctors and how the secret service opted "to deal"
with each one (i). Trained secret agents began to
note which doctors spoke eloquently, which
silenced a room with their presence, or which
seemed to exert control over the rest. This latter
point is very significant and many agents make
reference to it. In what little has been written on
the medical strike, two or three doctors are often
pointed to as having distinguished themselves as
leaders (j). Nevertheless, what can be seen from
these reports is that the young doctors were
completely removed from those who previous
academics considered to be their natural leaders.
In other words, the secret service reports present
evidence that challenges our prior understanding
of the alliances among the doctors. While other
archival sources, such as pamphlets, reveal the rifts
between them, it is these sterile reports of meetings
that record a personal slight, an applause cut short,
or discussion among those at the head table that
have not made it into official histories.
Recovering the daily activities realized
and the "words" pronounced by individuals
obviously has great appeal for historians;
however, extreme caution is needed when
using these sources. To openly rely on the
intelligence service's reports poses obvious
problems. First of all, it is imperative to take into
account the writer's partiality. The agents were
paid to identify potential discontent and they
often exaggerated examples of problems to
make their assertions more credible. In addition,
and not surprisingly, the individual level of
experience and education of each agent
determined the kind of report they wrote. While
some agents had an inquisitive nature, a keen
eye for detail, and wrote about their findings in
a clear and persuasive tone, others wrote in an
almost incomprehensible prose with double
meanings and a clear disdain for their privileged
charges. Others transcribed flyers that have
been lost or destroyed; although written with
clumsy grammar, the words survive in the
reports of these secret agents, as in the following
fragment:
…now the doctors confront the capitalist
exploitation of the Mexican bourgeoisie headed
by Díaz Ordaz because it does not want to
fairly resolve the medical conflict once and for
all. By crushing the truck drivers' protests,
giving shrapnel to the peasants instead of land
and freedom and, in a word, by defending its
own interests, and by prolonging hunger,
unhealthiness, and the slow death of our
people, the government reveals itself to be the
principal enemy of the people this government
invests millions of pesos in public buildings and
refuses to give the doctors a fair salary rise. The
unity in the unyielding struggle of all those
exploited will put an end to the exploitation of
man by man. (18)
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The ideas may not be clear, but what
is interesting is how the doctors appear in the
struggle alongside the peasants, truck drivers
and workers. 
Another problem is that the reports
underwent a series of revisions before being sent
to the President. Evidence was found of previous
drafts of documents, in which words had been
crossed out and substituted before the edited
final version was sent to the government. It is not
clear whether the author of the first report is also
the editor of the subsequent versions, but what is
evident is that, in some cases, the tone was
changed or details were eliminated. This editing
process becomes especially problematic in
reports used to demonstrate that communist-
oriented forces had infiltrated the movement and
were trying to destabilize Mexico from within.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly,
despite the inaccuracy of secret service reports,
they provide a unique perspective on the lives of
the doctors; this is no minor detail. Most of the
recorded history on the doctors, their work and
their actions in Latin America and in the rest of
the world come from their autobiographies or
from the detailed reports of hospitals or patients.
Ironically, these declassified reports
reveal that many of the government strategies and
powerful images used against the doctors came
from the doctors themselves. For example, on
December 7, 1964, an anonymous doctor
expressed his reservations about joining the
movement because, by not treating patients, he
did not want to be part of the "mass murder" of
the Mexican people (12). Months later, on
September 1, 1965, in his first Government
Report to the nation, president Gustavo Díaz
Ordaz severely reprimanded the doctors on
strike, labeled the medical movement as
criminal, and even classified the strike as "an act
of homicide" (19) because the doctors had failed
the Mexican people by breaking their sacred oath
to protect life. In the cheers that exploded after
Díaz Ordaz vowed to put an end to the
movement it was forgotten that the conditions
that had propelled young doctors to strike
continued unchanged in most Mexican hospitals.
END NOTES
a. Following a trend of documentaries and books
about the decade, in 2007 Routledge announced
the appearance of a new peer-reviewed journal,
The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and
Culture.
b. There is a significant amount of material about
1968 in Mexico; I only cite here works by Sergio
Zermeño (1), Rubén Aréchiga Robles (2), Elaine
Carrey and Lyman L. Johnson (3).
c. Comments of Miguel Cruz, from a personal
interview carried out in Mexico City on June 29,
2009 by the author of this article.
d. The protest of the Canadian doctors is
connected to the implementation of universal
health insurance, whereby the economic benefits
that they had enjoyed until that time would end
up under the State's control. Please see the book
by Robin Wolfe and Samuel Badgley (5).
e. In the original document in Spanish, this quote
was translated by the author. In this version, the
original source in English is quoted.
96
SA
LU
D
 C
O
LE
C
TI
V
A
, 
B
ue
no
s 
A
ir
es
, 
7(
1)
:8
7-
97
, 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
- 
A
pr
il,
20
11
 
SOTO LAVEAGA G.
Universidad Nacional de Lanús | Salud Colectiva | English Edition ISSN 2250-5334
f. For more detailed information on the "civil
war" within the American medical profession,
please see Paul Starr (6). For a more complete
perspective on the hierarchy within the
profession and its tensions, please see chapter 3:
"The medical division of labor," by Elliot
Friedson (7).
g. It is difficult to calculate the exact amount of
material on file because the files on individuals
are not public.
h. For instance, a list was drawn up with the
names and domiciles of "communist doctors who
have participated in the medical movement,"
though it is not clear what measures were taken
to determine their political orientation (16).
i. A common practice for gifted orators was to
offer them an unexpected fellowship to a
prestigious American or European university.
j. Please see especially Democracia en blanco
(11), in which two hospital medical directors are
pointed to as leaders of the movement.
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